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
POST CASTRO CUBA--AN OPPORTUNITY FOR

NORMALIZED CUBAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS

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UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

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POST CASTRO CUBA:
AN OPPORTUNITY FOR NORMALIZED CUBAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS

by

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A DEFENSE ANALYTICAL STUDY SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

IN

FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM

REQUIREMENT

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MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TITLE: Post-Castro Cuba: An opportunity for normalized Cuban-American relations. AUTHOR: Ronald P. McCoy, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

On 3 January 1961 the United States and Cuba severed diplomatic relations. The events of this period, culminating with the Bay of Pigs invasion and the missile crisis, sealed Castro's hatred for the United States, while reinforcing America's distrust for Fidel Castro. Supported by the Soviets, Fidel Castro for the past 30 years has aggressively pursued pro-Soviet "non-alignment" and revolution, with resulting instability in Africa and Latin America. In response, the United States has diverted its resources and attention to neutralizing Cuban exportation of revolution and subversion. Although Castro is unlikely to retreat from his ideals, the future of Cuba in a post-Castro era may offer significant opportunities beneficial to United States. This study will show that a policy of diplomacy through normalized relations with Cuba can serve United States security interests better than the present 30 year old policy of continued confrontation.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel Ronald P. McCoy (M.B.A., The University of Utah) is an officer in the services career field. He has served in numerous positions from squadron command at base level, to the major commands (TAC and ATC), and at Headquarters Air Force in the Pentagon. Colonel McCoy's decorations include the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal with five oak leaf clusters and the Air Force Commendation Medal. Colonel McCoy is a graduate of the Air War College, class of 1990.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In his annual report to Congress last year, the secretary of defense reiterated United States basic national security objectives. These objectives provide the direction and focus in developing national security policy. Two specific security objectives are important to this study since they provide the overarching influence on US policy relating to United States-Cuban relations. These objectives are:

> - Where possible, neutralize Soviet military presence and influence throughout the world, increase the disincentives for Soviet use of subversive force, and encourage independent policies by Soviet client states.
>
> - Address the root causes--military, political, economic and social--of regional instabilities, and maintain stable regional military balances. (1:34)

The secretary of defense report continues with an assessment of world insurgency and counterinsurgency.

> Today, the Soviet Union and Cuba continue assisting communist insurgents worldwide. In responding to these threats, our role is to assist others in defending themselves. We must train host nation forces in the technical skills needed to accomplish their mission, and we must work with the leadership of these countries to help them along the road to competent, just civilian government. Security assistance is one of our most potent instruments for assisting our friends and allies in achieving the internal security essential to the growth of democratic institutions. (1:44)

Within the Western Hemisphere, the secretary describes the role Cuba plays in diverting US security interests.

> We accord the highest priority defense planning to the defense of North America, the contiguous Caribbean Basin, and adjoining air and sea lanes on which we depend. We and our allies and friends have a wide range of common security needs throughout our hemisphere; in meeting them, we cooperate closely with the Canadians, as well as with our allies to our south.
>
> During the immediate post-World War II era, nations in the Western Hemisphere did not pose a serious threat to American security. This changed in the early 1960's with Castro's consolidation of power in Cuba and his export of revolution and subversion. This threat worsened in 1979 with the rise of the Marxist-Leninist Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, the first such regime on the America continent.... In recent years, however, the Marxist threat has been held at bay in El Salvador, Hondurus, and Guatemala, largely due to United States encouragement and support.
>
> Many serious challenges to our security remain. The Soviets, Cuba, and Nicaragua have expanded their military capabilities in the region. Nicaragua and Cuban defectors indicate that the expansion will continue. The Soviets and their allies are now in a position to threaten the Panama Canal, and to interdict our Caribbean Gulf ports and South Atlantic sea lines of communication. In the event of war, this would seriously impair our ability to obtain vital natural resources and to resupply our forces overseas. A second challenge to our security is the illicit cultivation, production, and trafficking of narcotics in Latin America, which supplies millions of American drug abusers.... A third concern is the re-emergence of major leftist insurgent groups in Colombia, Peru, Chile, and the continuing insurgencies in El Salvador and Guatemala. The possible linkage of the Colombian and Peruvian insurgent groups with the drug trade make them doubly threatening. A fourth challenge is the political crisis in Panama.... Finally, economic problems threaten the stability of a number of states and may eventually give rise to military takeovers. (1:52)

In his closing remarks, the secretary concludes that while the United States is not directly threatened by increased military capabilities of Cuba, the United States must recognize that the threat does exist for the new democracies of Central America. They

must deal with constant pressures of insurgency and military threats. Therefore, it is essential for the United States to support these allies and friends, or expect to face more serious threats in the future. (1:27)

The United States has not always had to deal with national security threats to the south. Following World War II, the United States was free to deploy its scarce military assets toward increasing requirements in Europe and the Pacific. It gave little attention to events in the Southern Hemisphere. The United States must now look south and rethink its security policies in a serious way. (2:205)

After years of guerrilla opposition, Fidel Castro suddenly came to power in 1959. During 1959 he consolidated power through the revolutionary movement and was named Prime Minister. A year later he sought out support from the Soviet Union as a counterbalance to US threats of an invasion. The Bay of Pigs invasion of April 1961 and the missile crisis of 1962 completed the scenario for future relations. These events permanently sealed Castro's hatred of the United States and fostered a reciprocal feeling of distrust by Americans for Castro. What made the Cuban situation different from previous Latin American revolutionary upheavals, however, was the significant influence of the Soviet Union in the Western Hemisphere for the first time.

For the last 30 years, Fidel Castro's position has changed very little. For Castro, the United States still poses a threat to his leadership position and to his interests of supporting

revolutions wherever they exist. Also, the problems of diplomatic and economic isolation still persist in the Cuban way of life. Yearning for political independence from the USSR, Cuba's efforts to secure autonomy from the Soviets have also faltered. Cuba has occasionally defied Soviet leadership, but economic dependence on the Soviet Union has limited Cuba's maneuverability. Nor is Castro inclined to refrain from internationalism to improve Cuba's relations with the United States. In recent years, Cuban influence in global issues has declined somewhat. But, changes in regional conflicts continue to provide ample opportunity for Cuban intervention and participation.

Although Castro is unlikely to retreat from his ideals, the future of Cuba in an era after his passing may offer significant opportunities beneficial to the United States. Threats to US national security interests might be reduced by unveiling to the Cuban people an alternative to the repressive government that exists today. More importantly, a post-Castro regime might reduce the Soviet presence in the Western Hemisphere and might restrain further Cuban adventurism in the Third World. Simply put, the United States might benefit by a normalization of relations with Cuba under a post-Castro government.

There are good reasons for a diplomatic rather than a confrontational approach. The United States maintains full diplomatic relations with a wide range of governments which it dislikes and with which it has serious disagreements. These countries include the Soviet Union, China, and South Africa to name

a few. Why not diplomatic relations with Cuba? An open dialogue, for example, would promote opportunities for continued discussions on relatively non-controversial issues of a bilateral nature: for example, on immigration laws, maritime boundaries, and exchange of prisoners. In time, discussions could lead to issues grappling with more sensitive problems, such as the deployment of Soviet military aircraft to Cuba and insurgent threats to democratic countries in the Third World. (3:386)

To understand what needs to be done and why, one must first understand Cuba's background and how it came to be ruled by a revolutionary by the name of Fidel Castro. From this perspective, Cuba's foreign policy, the role of the Soviet Union, and the relationship with the United States can be better understood. This study will conclude that a policy of diplomacy can serve the United States security interests better than the present 30 year old policy of continued confrontation.

CHAPTER II

POST WORLD WAR II CUBA

Instability and Uncertainity

Cuba entered the post world war period with a sense of social, economic and political depression. There were chronic and serious economic problems facing the country, along with a political system that seemed unable to take control of its destiny. Opportunities for socio-economic restructuring were continually being squandered, while widespread government mismanagement, graft and corruption were commonplace.

Cuba's economy was in stagnation. For centuries, sugar production had dominated the country's economic structure. As its single export commodity, sugar had not promoted long-term investments required for economic growth. Consequently, diversification of the industrial base was absent. Investors had grown content in maintaining assets in cash, hoping for rising sugar prices with the potential for quick profits. Thus economic conditions were uncertain for most Cubans. The people were living cycles of boom and bust. As time progressed, the economic system became increasingly unstable. (4:286-287)

In the 1950s, Cubans were discontented not only for

economic reasons, but also due to growing political unrest. For them, the Cuban lifestyle was one of both economic and political uncertainty. Political violence was commonplace, while the fluctuations in the economy just added to the stress and tension. The government of Fulgencio Batista in 1958 was increasingly seen as repressive, inept, corrupt and incapable of controlling the economic and social disorder.

Cubans were also resentful of what they saw as unfair US control and influence on their lives. Although possessing one of the highest per capita incomes in Latin America, Cubans lived on a North American cost of living index. Cubans depended entirely on the United States, but without the benefits or access to US social programs, employment opportunities, or wage levels. It was a bitter perception and a real source of Cuban anxiety and frustration.

The frustrations of the Cuban people toward the United States were born in the late 19th century when the United States first began exercising significant control over the island. Following the peace treaty with Spain in 1898, the United States gained sovereignty over Cuba. Military occupation followed until 1902, when a constitution was approved and the United States formally inaugurated Cuba as a republic. Three treaties were signed that year which would serve to perpetuate an umbilical relationship between the United States and Cuba for decades to come.

First, the Platt amendment was enacted into a formal

treaty, providing among other things, for United States intervention in case of any "instability" in Cuba. Although later repealed in 1933 the document served as a constant threat of intervention into Cuban affairs. For this reason, Cuba's political system could never develop into a true democracy, as Cuba's political leaders were not held accountable for their own mistakes. The second agreement was a reciprocity treaty which provided favorable bilateral trade arrangements with the United States. However, in exchange for financial security Cuba's trade system would be singularly tied to US markets. The result was a system that would cripple Cuban competition in the world's markets. The third treaty provided a lease arrangement for the US construction of a naval base at Guantanamo Bay. (5:45-46)

Although countries such as Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil took important steps toward industrial development in the early 20th century, this did not happen in Cuba. Wealth was used as a consumable commodity, rather than an investment for future growth. Along with the uncertainity of the sugar economy, political unrest and growing inflation, serious plans were continually postponed regarding the country's future. Taken together, these conditions brought growing discontent to the majority of Cubans--the working populace. It was the rural workers and farmers who received the low wages, the few social services, and the poor housing and poor education. They lived a life dependent on invisible forces. For them, it was a life of poverty and one of government neglect.

Social, economic, and political undercurrents were running

strong by the late 1950s. Numerous worker protests and dissatisfaction with government programs gave anti-Batista forces all the emotional outcry they needed to promote their cause. They capitalized on social frustrations, economic losses, and the people's political anger. Thus, the growing social unrest undermined Batista's power and made efforts at economic recovery virtually impossible. Violence in the streets increased. The more terror the government exerted to suppress the unrest, the more resistance the government received. By 1958, Cuba was approaching civil war. In the mountains of the Sierra Maestra, anti-Batista forces were mounting. Cuba was on the verge of drastic change. (4:294-299)

Rise of Fidel Castro

The end of the Batista government finally occurred on 31 December 1958. In the midst of overwhelming anti-government pressure, Batista fled Cuba. In his place, Fidel Castro's propaganda had won the people's support, and his weapons and revolutionary movement had defeated Batista's corrupt and inefficient army.

As Fidel Castro marched into Havana the Cuban population cheered that the revolution was now over. However, for Castro it was just the beginning. Castro gained much of his political leadership from his personal popularity. He was a gifted orator and charismatic person. Born in a small town in the northern

Oriente Province, he was raised in rural conditions. He understood the people's poverty and grew up where physical violence was seen as an answer to any problem. The revolution would be no different. Fidel was also dominated by a desire for notoriety and an unyielding demand for obedience. His personal ambitions now were driving him to seek absolute revolutionary power. He successfully appealed to the Cuban people, "Revolution first, elections later!" Because of overwhelming popular acclaim elections did not seem necessary. His messages encouraged greater morale for the revolution, and a call for all Cubans to heroic action.(6:38-39)

Heroics were indeed needed. The Cuban society was in crisis. It had lost faith in its institutions of government--its presidency, the congress, the courts, the army and police and the political parties. The country needed something to hold on to.

Fidel inferred on himself a sense of fate; for himself as a national leader and for the revolution itself. He proclaimed himself the redeemer of the Cuban people. He improvised quick, political actions as changing events necessitated. He understood the people's needs and the implications of his role in the revolution. He started by making substantial changes and whatever symbolic steps were necessary to show a break from past policies. The people responded.

Castro spoke of the revolution as a historical process, inalterable and indivisible. The rhetoric of Castro's revolution awoke the imagination of literally hundred of thousands of Cubans. His messages called for radical changes. By attacking the past and

the causes of the people's hardships, Castro appealed to all classes of people, which served to unite Cubans regardless of their political persuasions. In the name of "la revolucion", its force and being could literally mean all things to all people. Cuban nationalism was aroused and moving. Along with it, Castro increasingly emphasized his campaign of anti-Americanism to blame the United States for all of Cuba's ills.

Within a year, Fidel Castro had in fact become the government. More and more he responded directly to popular calls for action. Reform decrees provided immediate material relief for a vast number of people. In 1959, approximately 1500 decrees, laws and edicts were issued. Utility rates were reduced, labor contracts renegotiated and wages raised. Most importantly rents were reduced. Health and educational benefits for the poor and unemployment relief followed.

The most sweeping measure enacted was the Agrarian Reform Law. By its terms, all real estate holdings were restricted in size to 1000 acres (except land used for sugar, rice, and livestock production which was restricted to 3333 acres). Land exceeding these limits was nationalized. Much land owned by US citizens was affected by this measure.

Early government reforms led to greater expectations and popular support of the revolution. For most Cubans, the results were a relief. A significant redistribution of income (and wealth) was taking place. By the thousands, Cubans were developing an immediate, and unknowingly, lasting stake in the success of the

revolution.

Cuba was moving toward a government by decree and rule by one man. Support for the phenomenon of "fidelismo" was not unanimous however. For the minority of Cubans who disagreed there was little recourse. Close associates of Batista were exiled or executed. Landowners who protested the agrarian reform were joined by the wealthy who predicted economic ruin. A large number decided to emigrate to the United States.

Alarm was also being heard in the United States. US diplomatic protests were issued. American investments were being expropriated by many Cuban government decrees. The American people were shocked by the extreme measures and called for moderation. United States-Cuban relations were strained. In late 1959, the United States issued warnings of retaliation with the possibility of cutting off the Cuban sugar quota. The resistance to the agrarian reform program was now further serving to divide the ideological battles both in Cuba and the United States. As Ernesto "Che" Guevara later stated,

> Revolutionary leaders were at a crossroad. The great landowners many of them North Americans, immediately sabotaged the law of the Agrarian Reform. We were therefore face-to-face with a choice...: a situation in which, once embarked, it is difficult to return to shore. But it would have been still more dangerous to recoil since that would have meant the death of the revolution... The more just and more dangerous course was to press ahead...and what we supposed would have been an agrarian reform with a bourgeois character was transformed into a violent struggle. (4:323)

The decision to advance the revolution required a realignment of Cuba's social focus, and no less a reordering of

Cuba's international relations. Within Cuba, the government was literally turning itself inside-out. Government personnel were being replaced by loyalists, the "fidelistas." Defense of the nation became indistinguishable from defense of the revolution.

Within the United States there were demands for "prompt" compensation for assets acquired by the agrarian reform program. Rejecting United States demands, Castro instead reiterated his alternative repayment plan (a 20 year bond plan) as just compensation. This was rejected outright and relations with the United States deteriorated further. The verbal attacks made by Cuban exiles were also having their effects, but these too were denounced by Castro as further opposition to his revolution.

In February 1960, following visits with trade delegation officials, Cuba reopened diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. The guarantees of alternate markets for Cuba's exports and the promise of economic assistance assured Castro's revolution of economic survival. Conversely, the threat of a US sugar embargo was losing its relevance.

Cuban commercial agreements with the Soviet Union were used with great effect. The Soviets agreed to purchase Cuban sugar production under a long-term agreement. Additionally, the Soviets agreed to sell Cuba crude oil at a price considerably below that charged by foreign companies. The consequences were immediate when Cuba ordered Standard Oil, Texaco, and Shell Oil Companies to process Soviet petroleum. When they refused, their assets were nationalized. Up to this time, Cuban expropriation had been

confined to sugar and cattle lands and within the framework of agrarian reform. This move however, set US-Cuban relations up for direct confrontation.

President Eisenhower made his move in July 1960 and retaliated with a cut in Cuban sugar imports. Cuba quickly reacted with additional expropriations of US assets; utilities, mills, banks, and petroleum refineries. In October, the United States again retaliated. This time with a complete economic embargo on Cuba. What followed was unexpected. The Castro government nationalized a broad range of private enterprises, irrespective of national ownership. For the first time, the Castro government had moved against non-agricultural Cuban-owned properties. Cuba ordered the United States to reduce it embassy personnel. The United States responded on January 3, 1961 by severing diplomatic relations with Cuba.

The United States attempts to influence Castro's policies with economic coercion had failed. Conversely, Cuba's relation with the Soviet Union was still new and uncertain--but developing rapidly. Fidel Castro's revolution had challenged the position of US hegemony in Cuba and was now advocating a position of total elimination of United States influence on Cuba. The unknown issue was whether Castro's regime could survive without outside influence. (4:313-327)

Political Supremacy

The economic confrontation with Cuba forced the United States to make greater efforts, if it hoped to remove the Cuban leader. Cuban exiles were calling for US action along the lines of the obsolete Platt Amendment as justification for intervention. In March 1960, President Eisenhower authorized the Central Intelligence Agency to begin covert planning for an invasion of the island. However, in the Kennedy administration that followed, election campaign rhetoric failed to materialize. When Cuban exiles finally massed an invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs (Playa Giron) in April 1961, direct US air and naval support was withheld. Along with poor planning and inadequate in-country support, the results were a terrible failure.

Afterwards, the Soviets began introducing medium-range missiles into Cuba. President Kennedy was again faced with a political problem focused directly on Cuban affairs. After his showdown with Khrushchev and the eventual removal of the missiles, the relationship between Castro and the United States settled into seemingly permanent hostility and hate. An important change in international relationships had occurred. The US-Soviet agreement reached after the missile crisis prohibited the United States from undertaking any future hostilities against Cuba. On the other hand, the Soviets entered into closer ties with the Cubans. (6:48)

Cuba made a transition from capitalism to communism after 1961. Castro started a campaign with a commitment to building a

new Cuban economy. Mobilization strategies built on appeals to selflessness and sacrifice began. A new consciousness for Cuban workers was heralded; not one for personal gain, but for hopes of collective advancement of all. The Castro government began emphasizing moral incentives as the "right" thing to do for the revolution.

Between 1960 and 1970, the Cuban economy performed erratically. Appeals to self-sacrifice and moral incentives failed to sustain high productivity levels. Bottlenecks in distribution systems added to the chronic shortages in basic goods. The abrupt cutoff from United States capitalism and its source of raw materials also caused disruptions in the Cuban economy. As a result, absenteeism, low worker morale, low productivity and low product quality suggested that something was wrong. To these problems, the United States added covert action toward disrupting Cuba's economy. Paramilitary missions destroyed sugar mills, plantations, oil refineries, water systems, warehouses and chemical plants. Any asset of economic worth was a target. The United States also succeeded in disrupting trade initiatives with western Europe, by blocking credit to Cuba. (4:348)

After 1970, US covert action declined and the revolution felt more secure. The effect of the embargo with the United States also dwindled. However, Cuba needed a new economic course to correct past shortcomings. Castro led the charge against these obstacles. Untiringly he promoted improvements in the economic system with speeches and criticism of the bureaucracy. He made

far-reaching changes in the name of the revolution. Slowly, these changes increased productivity and exports. Strangely for the United States, the economic embargo and covert actions geared at promoting internal dissent, resulted in promoting a greater resolve among the Cuban workers. US foreign policy toward Cuba had, in fact, helped Castro's efforts to disengage completely from the US economic system. However, what it forced on Cuba was full economic reliance on the Soviet Union for direct trade and assistance. By the mid 1980s, Cuban export dependence on the Soviet Union had increased to 64 percent while import dependence reached 62 percent. The combination of economic growth and political stability, supported by Soviet credits and subsidies, was now having a beneficial effect for the Castro government. (4:355-356)

No less important during this period was the constant problem of Cuban dissent, even as domestic conditions appeared to improve. Dissension resolved itself often simply through emigration. Other dissenters, less fortunate, were jailed as political prisoners. However, between 1966 and 1970, over 200,000 Cubans actually departed. Of this group over 81 percent were managerial, professional, and skilled workers. By 1980, more than a half million had settled in the United States. (4:349) Over time, this group of middle-class Cubans would build support among US policymakers and the Congress in promoting a hardline US policy of ostracism of the Castro regime.

Along with domestic changes, Cuba's foreign policy went through many revisions reflecting changes in its international

positioning. As Fidel Castro saw the world, the Bay of Pigs invasion removed all doubts about United States determination of destroying the revolution, while the missile crisis revealed the Soviet Union's limitations in defending world revolutions. After this, Castro was keenly aware of his vulnerabilities in an East-West context. Because of cultural affinity and proximity, Castro first turned his attention to the developing countries of the Western Hemisphere. He needed to reduce Cuba's isolation, and more importantly he desired to rival the US leadership position in the Western Hemisphere. Additionally, because of the missile crisis, he was not going to concede to the Soviets their claim of leadership in world revolution. Consequently, he struck out with his own style of ambitious policies to emerge as a powerful force in Third World politics. He offered moral, as well as material aid to guerrilla movements wherever they existed; in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. "Principles are not negotiable", Castro claimed in 1980. "The duty of every revolutionary is to make the revolution." He was neither prepared to seek improved relations with the United States nor share with the Soviet Union his role as leader of world revolutions. (4:374-377)

CHAPTER III

CUBAN FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERVENTION

The Ideological "Wild Card"

The goals of the Cuban revolution were to secure economic and political freedom from the United States and to promote Cuban social reform. What it brought to Cuba was unplanned--direct confrontation with the United States and a near total dependency on the Soviet Union. (7:251)

Fidel Castro never accepted political dependence on the Soviet Union. Following the missile crisis in 1962, the Soviet-American agreement implied that Washington held the Soviet Union responsible for Cuba's actions and consequently expected Moscow to keep Castro under control. But Castro was not a party to this agreement and he did not submit totally to dependency. Thus, Castro was able to reject Cuba's position as a "satellite" or "pawn" of the USSR, while receiving immunity from further US intervention.

From these conflicts Cuba had to choose between--too much reliance on the Soviet Union, but fear of abandonment in a world crisis; to immunity from US attack, but subordination to the Kremlin. Through this dichotomy, Castro developed Cuba's foreign

policy on opportunities never deemed possible prior to the revolution.

To emerge with his idea of a new Cuba, Castro sought a position of influence in the Third World. He needed leverage to gain a more flexible relationship with the USSR, while forcing Washington into peaceful coexistence with Havana. (4:376) As a consequence, Cuba had to secure, even by guerrilla proxy if necessary, a clear political advantage in regions directly affecting United States strategic interests--Central and South America for starters. And, to reverse its dependency on the USSR, Cuba had to secure an important position in a region strategically coveted by the Soviets--Africa or the Middle East. From this play of strategic "gamesmanship", Fidel Castro formulated Cuba's role in world politics.(7:261-262)

The Western Hemisphere

In the period from 1959 through the early 1970s, Castro focused his first efforts on subversion and influence among the developing governments of Central and South America. However, Castro's capabilities in Latin America should also be understood in the context of the roles and objectives of the Soviet Union.

The primary Soviet objectives in Latin America and the Caribbean were to reduce the US influence and increase the Soviets' influence. Both objectives were relatively simple to obtain and did not require large expenditures of Soviet resources. From the

Soviets' perspective, American influence could be reduced by tarnishing the US image, by supporting Latin American "nationalism" and anti-Americanism and by complicating the execution of United States foreign policy. Soviet influence could be enhanced by expressing "concern" for Latin American diplomatic initiatives, by expanding the Soviet presence, and by increasing the levels of trade, and economic and military aid. For the USSR, it was important to challenge the United States geostrategic advantage. Any issue the Soviets' supported would help detract from the United States perceived security position. That, in turn, would add to the Soviets' security by diluting the US ability to threaten the USSR. Thus, the USSR could increase support to Latin American revolutionary movements because of its complications to United States interests.

This is not to say that Soviet-Cuban strategies have always been congruent. Between the 1960s and 1980s, Soviet-Cuban relations varied by degree and level of support in Latin America. However, by 1983 the Soviets were extending military assistance to Cuba as well as Grenada, Nicaragua, and Peru and were continuing aid to revolutionary groups elsewhere in Central America. Although, Grenada is no longer on this list since the US invasion in October 1983, Soviet military advisors remain in the other countries. Within Cuba, the Soviets still maintain at least one Soviet army brigade, while the Soviet navy continues its presence in the Caribbean. (10:193-198)

To better understand the Soviet-Cuban relationship, a brief

summary of Cuba's support for subversive groups is useful. It may also help to explain the Soviets' role, via Cuba, to United States security in the hemisphere.

In 1959 Cuba provided armed guerrilla groups to begin insurgency operations in Nicaragua. Although the forces were defeated and captured, it was a beginning. The consequence for Cuba was a simple condemnation issued by the Organization of American States (OAS). At this time, the OAS was declining in its own self-perception of real political influence and unity. Thus, its decision was hardly sufficient to slow down or modify Castro's grand scheme.

That same year, Castro also started guerrilla actions and terrorism against the government of Venezuela. Thus in 1964, after confirming and condemning his role, the OAS took more severe action and voted sanctions against Cuba. Eventually, Venezuela prevailed against the intervention and held its democratic government intact.

In 1961, Castro was providing Cuban armed and trained terrorists to Peru. By 1978 the Soviets had joined in and were providing military assistance to Peru at levels almost equivalent to the aid given directly to Cuba (Cuba received $675 million and Peru received $650 million). Peru became the Kremlin's first nonsocialist arms client in the hemisphere and its only "nonrevolutionary" client. (10:201)

In 1965, Cuba involved itself in aiding a subversive campaign to destabilize the Dominican Republic. In response, the OAS interceded and dispatched peacekeeping forces of US and Latin

American troops to restore order. Conflicts again surfaced in the early 1980s, with Cuba inciting communists to reunite and prepare for renewed military action.

Fidel Castro in 1966 organized the Tri-Continental Conference to promote violent revolutions. Following the conference, Cuba planned increased support to Marxist-Leninist terrorist groups. (8:30) In Bolivia, Castro dispatched "Che" Guevara in 1967 to start a peasant insurgency. He was later killed and the effort failed. In Argentina, the campaign of terror resulted in a military coup in 1976 against the regime of Eva Peron. This led to a war where over 9000 Argentines disappeared and were presumably killed. In Uruguay, terrorists launched attacks against the nation's democratic and social systems. The results were a military junta that ruled until 1985 when democracy was finally reinstated.

Failing by the 1970s to bring even one communist government to power, Castro saw a growing need to change his strategy. The Soviets, meanwhile had opened embassies in 12 Latin countries. This may have influenced Castro to break from his strategy of using guerrilla, armed-force tactics. Fidel Castro started seeking seemingly normalized relations with Latin American countries. Belatedly, the OAS passed a resolution in 1972 allowing members to normalize relations with Cuba. (4:378) Castro's wishes for a rapid emergence of revolutions in Latin America to join his Cuban Revolution had not materialized. He continued to see Cuba alone in its challenge to the United States.

However, this did not curtail Cuba's covert aid to radical groups who would wait for better times to act. After nearly two decades of failure, Castro established a new pattern of armed struggle in Central America. It had five strategic components. (8:33)

1. Unite traditionally splintered radical groups behind a commitment to armed struggle with Cuban advice and material assistance.

2. Train ideologically committed cadres in urban and rural guerrilla warfare.

3. Supply or arrange for the supply of weapons to support the Cuban-trained cadres' efforts to assume power by force.

4. Encourage terrorism in the hope of provoking indiscriminate violence and repression and generalized disorder in order to weaken government legitimacy and attract new converts to armed struggle; and

5. Use military fronts and radical governments through armed pro-Cuban Marxists.

In 1979 Castro called the Nicaraguan leaders to Cuba after their first insurrection attempt had failed. He insisted the three factions unite and work toward forming a broad alliance within Nicaragua itself, promising political democracy. The three factions did unite in March 1979. This helped to create sufficient opposition to the Somoza government, and more importantly would deceive Western governments about the communist nature of the Sandinista Front. Even though military power was still in the hands of the Sandinistas, their promised political intentions were sufficient justification for members of the OAS to transfer diplomatic recognition from Somoza to the Sandinista interim government on June 23, 1979. The triumph of the Sandinistas now

provided Cuba an ally in the region to further its role in Latin American insurgency. (8:34)

By 1984, Cuban-Soviet-Nicaraguan ties grew even closer. Over $200 million in Nicaraguan economic assistance per year was received from the Soviets alone (additional aid was also received from Eastern bloc countries, as well as Libya). Ironically, for the Soviets, if the Sandinistas survived the Soviets could congratulate themselves for gaining a new ally and friend in the hemisphere. If they did not, the USSR would be in a position to criticize the United States for meddling in the affairs of a sovereign state. The prestige of the United States in Latin America would be set back and the Soviets would see themselves as winners--a win-win situation for the USSR. (10:209-210)

In El Salvador, Castro in 1979 again involved himself when he, calling for unification of the guerrilla command structure, encouraged the formation of the FMLN (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front). Castro emphasized the need for a broad base of support, especially from the non-communists within the country. His plan called for gaining favorable support from Western nations which could later provide the political connections for obtaining Western economic aid following his FMLN victory.

The US Department of State cited that almost 200 tons of military weapons were shipped into El Salvador in 1981 via Cuba and Nicaragua, with much of it originating in or purchased by the Soviet Union. Debate still exists on how much actually reached the guerrillas. However the evidence suggested that Cuba (and

Nicaraguan) military aid had been significant in the continued struggle of the revolutionaries. (10:200) Fidel Castro's expectation that El Salvador would quickly follow the Nicaraguan victory never materialized. That struggle still continues between the Salvadoran government and rebels today.

By the 1980s, Cuba was slowly being considered the odd-government out in Latin American regional affairs. A major reason for this shift could be attributed to a rebuff of Cuba by most Latin American governments. Its influence had been diminished due to past Cuban misdirections (armed revolution), a new climate of US-Latin American relations, new economic opportunities, and more mature relations among Latin American neighbors themselves.

In summary it can be said that the attractiveness of the "Cuban model" has lost much of its appeal among the majority of Latin American countries. Surveys showed that the overwhelming majority of Latin Americans (at least 90 percent in most countries) did not wish to live under a communist regime. The Stalinist model is considered too violent, rigid, authoritarian, and too dismal to be attractive. Moreover, as the severe economic conditions brought on by the revolution are better understood and the details of the collapse of the Eastern Europe communist governments circulate, Cuba's attractiveness as a developmental model should diminish even further. (2:206-207, 211)

While Castro continually calls for "historic commonality" and a "historic obligation" to work together to solve common problems in the Caribbean basin, there is little evidence that the

governments of the region desire any stronger relationship with Cuba than already exists. Their agenda is changing, in part, by influences caused by more normal US-USSR relations, the economic problems surfacing within Cuba and the USSR, and an unwillingness of these governments to gamble their own hard-earned political and economic recovery by wooing Castro. (9:103)

Additionally, the USSR is not in a position of creating "another Cuba" in the Western Hemisphere. Cuba costs the USSR $5 to $7.5 billion per year (1987) in economic and military assistance. (10:199) Nicaragua has been an additional financial burden. The Soviets still provided the Nicaraguan revolution a $280 million economic package in 1985 and a $500 million package in 1988 (11:19). These investments provided the Soviets a presence in the region. However, with the democratic elections held in February 1990 continued Soviet participation in Nicaraguan affairs is in doubt.

The Soviet Union for a variety of reasons has maintained a close relationship with Cuba. It still represents for the communist bloc countries their one significant outpost in the Western Hemisphere. Cuba provides the USSR with military facilities and listening posts well situated in providing support and intelligence for activities throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.

Additionally, the Soviets see Cuba as a stepping stone for promoting Soviet-supported projects in Latin America. Whether the cause is for socialism or economic development, the USSR finds Cuba

a ready ally with a pro-Soviet orientation already in-place. Both countries have invested much in one another and both have much to lose if their relationship should alter in the future. (10:206)

The United States needs an opportunity to diminish the Soviet influence in the Western Hemisphere and to lessen the national security threat it brings to the United States and its southern allies. President Gorbachev has already warned Cuba that the USSR will not uphold the exportation of revolution. (17:151) The Soviet and Cuban economic crises might be used as a wedge between the USSR and Cuba and taken advantage of at an opportune moment. That opportunity may exist with the passing of Fidel Castro. By announcing a policy of diplomatic relations with Cuba, the United States could bolster its strategic position in the hemisphere. Normalization would demonstrate to the Cubans the non-threatening position of the United States toward Cuba--the main argument that has kept the Castro regime in power for over 30 years, while helping to reduce the significant influence of the Soviet Union in the Western Hemisphere.

Africa

Cuba's involvement in Africa was a challenge directed at both the United States and the Soviet Union. Recognizing Cuba's vulnerability in an East-West context, Fidel Castro looked to the African continent to secure Cuba's own bloc of political

constituents. Castro saw Africa as a way to satisfy Cuba's strategic self-interests, well ahead of, and in full cognizance of the Soviets' ultimate global policies; specifically, to extend Soviet power at the expense of the Western world, but short of provoking a third world war. Strong African roots in the Cuban population also provided an additional dimension and justification for Cuban involvement in Africa. (7:266)

Cuba saw the emergence of new African states and their strategic importance to the Kremlin. Through them, Castro could influence the access of raw materials needed by the United States and its allies for essential support of their military-industrial complex. By placing Cuba in a position of political influence in Africa, Havana could obligate the Kremlin to call on Cuba first. Through its footholds in several key African states, Castro placed the USSR in a state of dependence vis-a-vis Cuba. For this reason, Africa became the very nerve center for Cuban international politics. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, Castro had placed Africa well ahead of Cuba's interests in Latin America. On the African continent, Castro saw that he could satisfy his need for leverage against the USSR, while the Soviets made inroads in their strategic goal of denying the Western nations access to economic raw materials. (7:269-270)

In October 1973, Castro sent Cuban combat troops outside the Western Hemisphere, first to Syria to help with attacks against Israeli forces during the Yom Kippur War. Then in 1974, Castro initially sent 36,000 troops to participate in the Angolan war to

help assure victory for the pro-Soviet Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Cuban assistance to the MPLA was decisive in opposing forces backed by the United States, South Africa and China. (8:31)

Cuba further expanded its military aid programs to Africa and the Middle East. Military missions were also established in Sierra Leone (1972), South Yemen (1973), Equatorial Guinea (1973) and a year later, 15,000 troops were sent to Ethiopia. By 1977, Ethiopia's Emperor Selassie had been overthrown and replaced by a pro-Soviet dictator, Col Mengistu. (4:378-379)

After 14 years in Angola, Cuba agreed to the removal of its troops under an agreement that allows the self-proclaimed Marxist MPLA to retain control of the Angolan government and to continue receiving Soviet aid. The peace negotiated in 1988 called for the withdrawal of over 50,000 combat troops by July 1991. (12:16) At the same time, Cuba has achieved the independence of Namibia and the likely installation of a Marxist government under the control of SWAPO (South-West Africa People's Organization).

Cuban assistance to Africa, however, was not limited to military aid. Larger commitments were made for a wide range of socio-economic programs. Cuban doctors, teachers, construction workers, and engineers now work in African countries. They work in Uganda, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Congo, Mali, Mozambique and Madagascar. They have made Cuba first among equals in the Third World. Although they may not be pushing the cause "to victory always", they will help the revolution survive. Havana's future

is in the hands of the Third World and its influence will depend on the reputation of the internacionalistas. Even the poorest countries ccnsider Cuba to be an international superpower. Today, Cuba has more physicians working abroad than any industrialized nation, and more than the UN's World Health Organization. Cuban medical personnel, construction workers, engineers and teachers find international service, "a sign of personal courage, political maturity, and an uncompromising attitude toward the "imperialist enemy."" They view Cuba not so much as Moscow's representative, but as its successor. (13:30-31)

What this means to the United States is that Cuban influence is well entrenched on the African continent. For example, the influence Cuba exerts in the name of internationalism could be applied in future regional conflicts, as was the previous case in Angola. The US Senate Foreign Relations Committee report, "U.S. Minerals Dependence on South Africa," cites reasons for concern.

> The dependence of the United States and other Western industrial countries on South African minerals is an issue which seems to surface each time...there are new signs of unrest within South Africa or on its borders.
>
> The report includes several important observations:
>
> - Western industrial states are much more dependent on South African minerals exports, in the sense that there are few alternative sources for chrome, vanadium, manganese and platinum, than South Africa is on the West for export earnings from those minerals.
>
> - ...The greatest risk from a leftist regime is not over foreign policy issues, but rather changes in domestic policies which would result in decreased minerals production (because of flight of capital and skilled labor and management).

- The most likely scenario for cutoffs of minerals from South Africa would involve domestic social unrest and possible violence which could reduce production or eliminate it for brief periods of time. (14:iii-iv)

In terms of Cuba's future intentions in Africa the evidence is mixed. It is premature to conclude that Angola is definite proof of Castro's abandonment of "proletarian internationalism", demonstrated by Cuba's recent decision to temporarily suspend troop withdrawals. Additionally, his behavior in other Third World nations remains somewhat unchanged. Thousands of military advisors remain in Ethiopia, while thousands of Cuban internacionalistas continue their work among the peoples of Africa. (15:50) The critical issue facing the United States, both in the Western Hemisphere and Africa is to determine the entangled strategies between Cuba and the Soviet Union.

Cuban-Soviet Relations

Fidel Castro faces the possiblity that new Soviet elites rising to power will be less tolerant of Cuban inefficiencies and its enormous waste of resources. From Castro's point of view the Soviets are simply softening their committment to communism. However, new East-West relations may reduce Cuba's importance to Moscow and make continued outlays of resources even more difficult to secure. Soviet analysts doubt that the Soviet Union will be able to maintain (let alone increase) aid to Cuba. Moscow seems somewhat more determined this time to do something about its own

economic problems.

Soviet bloc military aid to Cuba from 1982 to 1986 came to approximately $8 billion. This allowed Cuba to build the largest combat forces in Latin America, with approximately 300,000 military, and a militia that exceeds one million personnel. (15:49)

Despite the economic burdens Cuba places on the Soviet Union, it will probably not risk allowing the Castro regime to fail. Today, Castro is facing the worst economic crisis in the history of the revolution. These conditions may explain why Cuba has become more accommodating to the Soviets; as witnessed by their acceptance to remove combat troops from the costly conflict in Angola (now suspended) and their agreement toward reconciliation and negotiated settlements rather than on guerrilla warfare (with the exception it seems of El Salvador).

Soviet-Cuban relations over the past 30 years have served both nations well. However the world has changed. A close relationship in the future may not serve Havana and Moscow as it once did in the past. With the new emphasis on tension reduction and the peaceful settlement of regional disputes, the large scale introduction of Cuban troops especially into non-aligned nations may undermine rather than enhance Cuba's influence. With severe difficulties in the Soviet Union, costly Cuban intervention would not serve to help Gorbachev's economic reform efforts either.

At times, Castro seems no longer ready to overthrow established governments, but would rather increase his influence among them and play a much greater role in hemispheric affairs.

In this role, he does not need Soviet support. In fact less identification with Moscow may serve him better. This holds true with the non-aligned nations, who understandably fear too much superpower influence in their internal affairs.

Cuba will still need Soviet support for some time. Conversely, the Soviets see Cuba as much less valuable than before. It does not see the "Cuban model" as any concept to follow, especially if Moscow had to pay the bill. The Soviets see value in continuing the military electronic eavesdropping capability that Cuba provides and the use of airfields to re-service Soviet reconnaissance aircraft. However, with the problems facing Gorbachev, Soviet interests would not necessarily be damaged by a reduction of the relationship. The lower the Cuban cost, the better for the Soviets. The most likely trend is that Cuba will play a larger role in the Third World, especially within the Non-Aligned Movement with less emphasis on the Soviet Union.(16:181-183)

The Soviet Union is also attempting to balance its position with the United States. Given the economic crisis in the USSR, Gorbachev has decided to "fix" his economy through a reduction in Soviet defense spending. He can only accomplish this in an environment of stability with the United States. Thus one finds evidence for the Soviet shift in settling disputes through diplomacy, rather than through armed conflict. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze stated that the USSR is no longer interested in conducting ideological warfare with the West in the Third World.

This change in Soviet thinking toward the Third World has resulted in a dramatic effect on Cuba's standing with the Soviets. In fact, even though Cuba is one of the most militarized states in the world, when it came to arming a new Cuban militia, the Soviets refused to furnish Castro with the weapons. Cuba was forced to acquire the arms from North Korea. (17:154-155)

Aside from these issues, the USSR will retain Cuba as an ally. The Soviets have no substitute for Cuba's geographic location. To carry out deep cuts in their defense spending, the Soviet requirements for improved intelligence will become even more important. To make these cuts, Gorbachev needs to retain critical support provided by the Soviet military establishment. Lastly, Gorbachev's perestroika will only succeed if the USSR can reduce its defense budget. For this he needs stability with the United States, and a Cuban leader willing to accommodate himself diplomatically in the Third World. (17:161-162)

CHAPTER IV

UNITED STATES AND CUBAN RELATIONS

Foreign Policy Frustrations

In January 1961 the United States suspended diplomatic relations with Cuba. From 1961 to 1977, the Swiss acted in providing communications between the United States and Cuba. In 1977, however, the United States established a small "US interest section" in Havana and since that time has maintained the capability for direct dialogue with Cuba. The "chief of mission" acts in a similar fashion to that of an "ambassador". Also, there is a "Cuban interest section" office in Washington, D.C.

The problem with US-Cuban relations has not been necessarily the means for communications, but rather the substance of the communications--an attitude by both countries not to talk seriously about substantial issues. There are many issues of disagreement between the United States and Cuba. To date, there has been little willingness to negotiate in a serious way issues that might benefit both countries. (18:41)

Cuba has said that it is prepared to negotiate a compensation agreement for US citizens whose property was confiscated in the 1960s. Other countries having claims have since

resolved them. However for the US, compensation is also tied to the trade embargo problem. Cuba does not have sufficient hard currency to pay the bill for properties expropriated in the past. One solution in circulation suggests that renewed trade with the United States would help Cuba earn the money to pay off its claims. There are other solutions. However, serious dialogue is needed if this 30 year old problem is to be resolved any time soon. (18:41)

Another issue is the complaints of Cuban involvement in Central America. The United States has been criticized for not discussing with Cuba the overall problem in the region nor any aspects of Cuba's role in it. While it can be postulated that the USSR heavily influences Cuba's foreign policy, the USSR as discussed earlier can not effectively control it. Negotiations with the Soviets on Central America are simply not adequate alone to restrain Castro's initiatives or his desire for world power status. Dialogue and diplomacy are needed. Regional stability might be improved by including Cuba in the peace negotiations. Ignoring Cuba's involvement is much like wishing away the problem. Is it time for a new approach?

In the decade following the Cuban missile crisis US leaders made little attempt to begin a dialogue with Castro. However by 1977, President Carter started talking with Cuba. His negotiations, however, were generally considered a failure, due in part to circumstances, timing, and an inflexible strategy. As Carter opened talks, Cuba was responding to Angola and Ethiopia and sending in troops. The US demanded, regardless of what the South

Africans or Somalis were doing, that Castro simply remove his troops before discussing the problem. No effort was made to implement a multilateral negotiation process (as was successfully undertaken by former Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker in 1988 resulting in a peace accord in Angola). After 14 years of bloodletting and a much firmer foothold in the region, Cuban combat troops started returning to Cuba (now temporarily suspended).

Neither did the United States discuss the situation in Ethiopia with Cuba. The United States was criticized for allowing the Soviet Union and Cuba into thinking it had decided to back Somalia. When Somalia invaded, Moscow and Havana thought the United States was somehow behind it and came to Ethiopia's aid. The United States then condemned, not the aggressor--Somalia--but Cuba and the USSR for aiding the victim. (3:387) Again, would a more effective communications network have been more successful?

In 1979 President Carter confronted the Soviets on the issue of a "combat" brigade in Cuba. The brigade had been in Cuba for some time, but in a charged environment surrounding support for the SALT II treaty, Carter had declared the brigade's presence "unacceptable". The stirrings over an "intelligence squabble" forced Carter to accept a face-saving declaration that the brigade was not a combat unit. (5:49)

Another case of poor understanding of the situation was the 1980 Mariel boatlift. At least two interpretations can be suggested as to why the events happened. However, neither rationale justifies turning 125,000 refugees loose at sea. First

is the view that in 1977 Castro was in need of hard currency. He targeted the Cuban-American community by allowing them to visit relatives in Cuba. He then charged them exorbitant prices for what they bought and for services they did not receive. As expected, they provided Cuba with hundreds of thousands of dollars. The effect of these visits was unexpected though. Cubans did not see their American relatives as poor and exploited as the government wanted them to believe. They saw a completely contrary condition. The resulting disillusionment caused Cubans to flee Cuba by whatever means were available. (15:46)

The second interpretation states that the United States and Cuba were proceeding with talks on immigration. Cuba was concerned with boat hijackings (early Mariel emigres). Cuba protested and asked the United States to define its position. Cuba after all was cooperating with efforts against aerial hijacking, arresting and trying hijackers and immediately returning planes and passengers. The United States to the contrary neither arrested the boat hijackers nor responded to the Cuban inquiry. By March 1980 Cuba warned it would retaliate by allowing a massive exodus of refugees to enter Florida waters freely unless the United States took a position. The Carter administration was surprised when Cuba finally carried out its intentions. (3:387-388)

The Reagan administration came to office refusing to negotiate anything with Cuba. Having accomplished nothing by 1984, the administration began to explore issues relating to the movement of people between both countries. Cuba agreed to take back a

number of criminals who had arrived in the Mariel boatlift and to respect US immigration laws. The United States in turn agreed to establish a normal flow of immigration from Cuba. (3:388) By November 1987, the immigration agreement was again beginning to operate following initial disagreements on radio broadcasting.

Conflicts arose in 1983 over the broadcast of Voice of America's Radio Marti into Cuba. Castro viewed this as a violation of the immigration accord. President Reagan accepted Castro's interpretation and talks on radio broadcasting were finally begun. This appeared to be the first signal from the United States to approach Cuba on a number of consular matters. The Angola settlement reached along multilaterl lines soon followed in 1988. (3:388) Additionally, cultural delegations started to receive visas, as well as Cuban nuclear safety personnel who will visit US facilities. Because of its proximity to Florida, the United States sees an interest in avoiding a Chernobyl type nuclear accident in Cuba, where the Soviets are constructing a nuclear energy plant scheduled for operations in 1990. (19:73)

While Castro seems willing to negotiate with the United States on social and economic issues, the question appears whether Castro is willing to make meaningful political concessions. For example, his relationship with the USSR, use of Cuban military forces, and support for revolutionary insurgents will require adjustments.

So far, Castro says he is not ready to make ideological concessions. On July 26, 1988, the 35th anniversary that launched

his struggle for power, Castro rejected any possibility for change. "Cuba will never adopt [the] capitalist method, style or philosophy. We are proud of our ideological purity." (20:20-21)

Despite the rhetoric, Cuba's economic crisis has shown signs of Castro's need for obtaining technology, tourism, markets for Cuban sugar and services that the US can offer. He appears ready to compromise on non-political issues. Prior to the revolution, almost 70 percent of Cuba's foreign trade was with the United States. Today that level of trade is with the Soviet Union. Cuba's natural trading partners are in the Western Hemisphere and not in the Soviet Union. According to one Latin American specialist in the US, "This kind of normal commercial intercourse requires normal political relations." (21:36)

Castro has urged resistance to any capitalist tendencies, except in tourism. Interestingly, Castro has proclaimed that "tourism" is far more profitable than oil. He has recently approved an "experimental centre" for Cuban tourism. A private/public company has already set up operations with Panamanian, Spanish, and Italian capital. It plans to spend $250 million dollars on tourist facilities in Cuba. (22:13)

US businesses are also ready to reinvest in Cuba, if and when the trade embargo is lifted. Congressman Bill Alexander (D-Arkansas), "is not convinced that the difference between the Soviets and the Cubans merit such double standards." Congressman Alexander wants to change the law. "If a Kansas wheat farmer can sell wheat to the Soviet Union, why should an Arkansas rice farmer

be forever forbidden from selling his rice to Cuba?" He estimates it could mean $50 million per year for US rice farmers alone.

A much larger issue is the cost of the embargo for US businessmen. An additional $750 million could be earned if the US lifted the Cuban sanction. So far, it is estimated that the embargo has cost US business at least $30 billion. Additionally, nearly all Western nations are trading with Cuba. In 1986, Western trade reached $1.6 billion. Ironically, the US trade embargo has not been ironclad. The US Treasury report in 1987 showed that 47 percent of Cuba's western imports came from subsidiaries of US companies and 53 percent of Cuba's western exports went to subsidiaries of US companies. Cuba therefore is already conducting about 50 percent of its western trade with US subsidaries. As for tourism, executives from Omni and Hyatt hotels are exploring opportunities Cuba has to offer. (18:40)

Lifting the embargo would give Cuba the opportunity to reduce its reliance on the Soviet Union. Opponents of lifting the sanction cite Cuba's debt as an impediment to trade with the United States. Cuba's two main sources for hard currency, sugar and reexported Soviet oil, have experienced declining prices and contribute to Cuba's debt to the West. Cuba, however would prefer to trade with the United States. The embargo was intended to deprive the Cuban regime of hard currency which could be used to finance Cuba's "export of revolution". But for the past 30 years the embargo has not proven to be an effective tool.

The embargo appears to have had little influence on Cuba's

foreign policy decisions. And, since the United States has cut its trading relations with Cuba, it no longer has the leverage and other inducements that trading partners normally have with one another.

Meanwhile, Cuba has turned to Latin America for trade. Its Latin trade increased from 160 million pesos in 1975 to 347 million pesos in 1987. (18:41)

The arguments on the US embargo are mixed indeed. While it has failed to prevent Cuba from getting access to western goods and technology, it has succeeded in raising the economic costs that Castro must pay for his anti-Americanism, revolutionary adventurism and military alliance with the Soviet Union. (15:45)

Some US policymakers believe the United States policy has worked and continues to work. To them, Castro is no longer seen as a charismatic revolutionary hero, but a ruthless dictator and abuser of human rights who has ruined Cuba. They believe instead of encouraging a thaw in relations, the United States should toughen its policy. (15:45)

There is also a middle ground. The recent changes in Cuban policy argues for a positive response. Washington could discuss whether Castro really wants a constructive relationship with the United States and not just the US dollars to reenforce his control over the Cuban people. Since Havana needs relations with Washington rather than vice versa, it is incumbent for Havana to show the initiative. A balanced, bilateral agenda is needed. The United States could move favorably toward a more normal

relationship, but this would follow, not precede Castro's actions. (15:52-53) If Castro does not respond during his lifetime, which is most likely to happen, the United States should prepare to accommodate the Cuban situation in a positive way after his passing. The security of the Western Hemisphere would be the better for it.

Narco-Terrorism

The term narco-terrorism "denotes a merger of international terrorism and international drug trafficking." For insurgents and terrorists, drug trafficking provides cash to purchase weapons and finance operations. For the drug trafficker, terrorist tactics help insure a source of supply and the discipline needed to hold their organizations together. The by-product for both groups is violence, irrespective of national boundaries or international standards. For states which permit narco-terrorism, the payoff is a weapons system that serves to terrorize, disrupt, and undermine the foundations of the targeted society.

The large network of narco-terrorism in the Western Hemisphere includes drug cartels and insurgent groups in Colombia, transhipment points for narcotics and arms in Nicaragua, Cuba, Mexico and "money-laundering" in other states, most notably in Panama during the Noriega regime. Castro has established Cuba as the principal sponsoring state for narco-terrorism. He has managed the details between Cuba, former General Noriega of Panama,

Colombian insurgent movement M19 and the Medellin Cartel by protecting vital narcotic shipments from Colombia through Cuba to the United States. (23:32)

According to the testimony of Jose Blandon Castillo, a former aid to Noriega. "the war in Central America waged by the United States made it easier, or at least gave him [Castro] the moral justification, to do anything against the United States, anything that was necessary." His testimony was also confirmed by then-Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Enders to the US Senate in 1982. As late as March 1988, further indictments were handed down in Miami outlining the connections between drug rings and Cuban officials in the continuing use of Cuban ports for the transshipment of Colombian narcotics. Why is Castro behind this? A high ranking Cuban Intelligence Service defector puts it this way:

> One of the reasons for this drug traffic with the United States is to throw the U.S. off in Central America, and his big operation of drugs coming up to Miami is part of that. They are trying to create an atmosphere of crisis in the southern United States, and then throw you off and work in the northern areas. (23:32-33)

Narcotics have thus become a powerful weapon in the Cuban strategy. The United States is confronted by the role Cuba plays in narcotics trafficking and the terrorist tactics it employs. Along with other serious issues facing US-Cuban relations, the drug problem cries out for diplomacy and direct dialogue on the issues.

Cuban Exiles and US Politics

United States hostility toward Cuba has as much to do with domestic politics as it does with world politics. The United States has refused to recognize Fidel Castro since 1961. While the Cuban government has played the principal role in isolating its people, the policies of the United States have also contributed. Keeping this foreign policy alive after 30 years is the political fear it instills in those most able to change it.

Since the first Cuban exiles arrived in the United States, a strong anti-Castro sentiment has persisted. In Florida where there has been an historically large concentration of Cubans, Democrats have feared the financial and political strength of the Cuban-American community. With their alleged ultraconservative views on foreign policy and Cuba in particular, Florida Democrats have not shown any inclination but to maintain a hard-line approach toward Castro. Since the Democrats also enjoy a majority in the US House of Representatives it is unlikely they will offer up any bold initiatives regarding Cuba either. Many Democrats are afraid of the political backlash that might come about from the Cuban-American community. They see Cuba as communism in their own backyard and they do not wish to be labeled soft on communism. Liberal Democrats might support a policy of normalization with Cuba, but only if the initiative came out of the White House.

Moderates would likely vacillate on the issue for fear that a Republican opponent would accuse them of giving way to communism. (24:395)

Furthermore, the power of the anti-Castro lobby is strong. Since its formation in 1981, the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) has been one of the most effective lobbies in Washington. The central figure in the CANF is Jorge Más Canosa, founder and chairman of the group. A financially successful Miami businessman and anti-Castro activist, Más has cultivated alliances and has built strong support among key Administration and Congressional leaders. According to The Miami Herald, Más is "the most powerful Cuban exile in America. Más hopes to use that power to overthrow the regime of Fidel Castro and become the president of Cuba himself." (25:389)

The CANF thus enables Más to wield tremendous influence on US policy toward Cuba. By political maneuver, Más and the CANF have been effective in enlisting the support of Florida Representative Dante Fascell, the powerful chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the US House of Representatives. In that key position, Fascell can make or break legislation relating to Cuba. However, to retain his position, the South Florida congressman must win re-election every other year in a district highly comprised of Cuban-American voters.

The executive branch has been active also. The President in 1981 signed National Security Decision 17, a plan for covert operations in Central America. It notes "that US and European

public opinion jeopardized the Administration's policy of confrontation with Cuba and Nicaragua and ordered the following remedy: Build public pressure against Cuba by highlighting human and political rights issues. Use the international Cuban community to carry the message." (25:389,391-392)

By 1988, opinion was growing that Washington's policy of hostility toward Cuba was no longer making sense. In fact, foreign policy analysts started thinking that the time had come to begin normalizing relations with Cuba. A Gallup opinion poll for Potomac Associates found that "51 percent of a sample of policy-makers and opinion leaders think that the past policy toward Cuba has hindered US interests rather than promoted them, and 85 percent favor negotiations leading to full diplomatic ties." Additionally, a significant number of Americans favored a more conciliatory approach. The Potomac Associates poll found that 51 percent of the general public favored negotiations (versus 31 percent against). (24:395-396)

Sentiment has even changed somewhat in the Cuban-American community, the traditional center of political opposition to Castro. On the embargo issue, about 40 percent would like to see it "eased or ended altogether". (18:40) The sanctions adversely affect them on a personal level. It is difficult for Cuban-Americans to telephone relatives in Cuba because the telephone lines between the US and Cuba predate 1959. Mail between the countries must go through Mexico or Europe and personal travel is still extremely limited. For Cuban-Americans, the sanctions and

isolation policy have hurt. Along with the business community, the Cuban-American community has been increasingly advocating easing restrictions and trade with Cuba. Cuban-American politics it seems are now in transition. (18:40)

While support for normalizing relations with Cuba is growing, the CANF has successfully negated any attempt to explore alternatives to the conflicts between the US and Cuba. And as long as US policy continues to support the exiles' right wing (CANF), the group will wield influence out of proportion to its size. Thus, the CANF influence over the exile community makes it virtually impossible for opposing views to be seriouly heard (or heeded). Important Cuban business groups in Miami, along with the large influx of Mariel Cubans have been keen to the idea of better US-Cuban relations. They see agreements on mail, telecommunications, and unrestricted travel as more important today, and with greater support for these changes among Cubans themselves, than what existed in the 1970s. (26:392,394)

Still the political cost-benefit analysis of normalization is intimidating. Whenever normalization is discussed in Washington, the Angola and Ethiopia precedents are cited as warnings. If a US president crawls out on a political limb to improve relations with Cuba, he has no guarantees that Castro won't cut it off. Furthermore, a policy of normalization with Cuba would produce few immediate results to offset the political costs and risks involved. Castro would still not throw the Soviets out, nor discard socialism. At best though, a more normal relationship

would gradually increase Cuba's ties to the West and tend to reduce its dependency on the Soviet Union. In time, this might allow Cuba to develop more nationalistic and independent policies. However, this would take years to achieve. The political victory will go not to the president who set the policy in motion but to the many presidents who follow. (24:396) Thus, the current US political inertia towards Cuba will most likely prevail until such time as Castro departs from power.

CHAPTER V

CUBA OF TODAY

Failure of the Revolution

It has been 30 years since Fidel Castro marched triumphantly into Havana. Today, he still sees himself as a guerrilla--the defender of the revolution's faith and one of the last true communists. With Moscow now experimenting with democracy and reaching out to the West, Fidel Castro says he is having none of it. Castro has announced a return to communist orthodoxy, cancelling private initiatives and putting down any signs of the profit motive.

The *rectification* campaign, first decreed in April 1986 and reaffirmed since, has resulted in the shut down of private farmers markets, private businesses and other forms of private endeavors. Production bonuses and other profit incentives have also been cut back. In their place, Castro has urged a return to personal incentives and self-sacrifice. He states, "There will be no tolerance whatsoever for laziness, negligence, incompetence or irresponsibility." (27:128)

Cuba has come upon hard times. The government can not afford to pay workers more and the need to reduce widespread

corruption in the distribution of raw and finished goods has taken its toll on the economic system. Additionally, bad weather and falling prices for Cuban sugar and re-exported Soviet oil have significantly cut hard currency earnings. (28:37-39)

Commodities continue to be rationed, especially foodstuffs. Citizens are only entitled among other items to: four pounds of sugar, five pounds of rice, one bath soap, and one laundry soap, one pound of chicken every nine days and three quarters of a pound of meat every 36 days. Deliveries are late and recently chicken has been substituted for meat. Non-rationed markets exist that sell items at astronomical prices. Few are affordable to the general population. Quality is poor to non-existent. Canned foods with expired dates are sold regardless of their health risks. (30:24)

Living conditions are crude. (29:42) Housing is not adequate, with overcrowding, resulting in serious social problems. These include high suicide rates, divorce, alcoholism, deviant sexual behavior, crime, and widespread street violence. (29:24)

Cuban health care is no better. Antiquated water and sewer systems abound, resulting in hazardous conditions and contaminated drinking water. Fidel Castro admitted that quality public health care is still inadequate; hygienic conditions in some facilities are substandard and there are delays in putting expensive equipment to use. He complains that the production of many medications is unstable and their distribution poor. (27:127)

The Cuban educational system also leaves much to be

desired. Although Cuba has witnessed educational improvements compared to other Latin American countries, Castro notes that classes are still mediocre or poor and notes rather than textbooks are often relied upon. (27:127) The main problem in Cuban education remains its isolation from the developed countries of the world.

As a result, Cubans seem particularily demoralized by Castro's call for moral incentives. Not all see the *rectification* process as a success. Complaints seem to outweigh the praises. Cuban youth are especially vocal about their future. Politics is not one of their priorities and they seem turned off by years of schooled indoctrination. Few consider themselves as counterrevolutionary, but they would probably fight if the United States should ever invade Cuba. Ironically, if given a chance to emigrate, many indicate a willingness to reside in the USA. (28:40)

The common man in Cuba is absolutely subservient to the government. The republic's constitution itself establishes very clearly that the country exist only for those who support the government. Cubans do not enjoy the freedoms of association, movement, expression, or communications. Thus, Cuban citizens are bound by laws that legalize the witholding of their fundamental rights. (30:24)

The repressive nature of the Cuban system under Fidel Castro bears this out, despite international pressure from such groups as the United Nations Human Rights Commission. Human rights abuses in Cuba abound. They are characterized by:

-- a one party system. The Communist Party is the only party permitted by law. Its leadership completely controls the political process.

-- no guarantees of freedom of assembly or association.

-- the state monitoring of private citizen's activities. Telephones are tapped and mail is opened.

-- restrictions to overseas travel. Emigration is strictly controlled. Those who apply are often dismissed from work, evicted from housing and denied access to consumer goods.

-- no freedom of speech. Criticism of the party or its leadership is prohibited.

-- a press controlled by the state. The media operates according to strict party guidelines.

-- a state school system. Education is the exclusive prerogative of the state. No religious or private schools or universities are allowed.

-- restrictions on citizens who practice their religion. The most serious problem according to church leaders is their exclusion from the Communist Party along with the restrictions on holding high level positions in government. (31:216)

-- arbitrary arrest and detention. Arrests can be made secretly and without warrants.

-- a court system which in practice is subordinate to the Communist Party. Defense attorneys are often ill-prepared, unsympathetic and frequently not informed of the trial until the day it begins. Cuban rules of evidence do not meet international

standards. (32:59-61)

A new generation of Cubans is growing up without the experience of the darker days of the Batista government for comparison. Although the new generation is well versed in shouting slogans and catchy phrases, they are less enthusiastic than their parents. It is therefore likely that the new generation of Cubans who learn about the freedoms and liberties being granted to the peoples of Central Europe will also be influenced to seek democractic reforms.

Many outside observers have noted a considerable amount of cynicism in Cuba. The people can not change the system, but they do not have to like it either. They resign themselves to the government and make accommodations. Some estimate that one third of the population of Cuba would leave if the means were made available. (2:212)

Cubans are not physically or psychologically close to the Soviet Union. The attractiveness of the United States to Cubans, however, is great. Even after 30 years of revolution, the Cuban preoccupation of the outside world is focused on the United States--its styles, music, dress, jeans, and political and economic systems. Additionally, the people are depressed about their own conditions and their country. They are not happy. There is little money and not much in the way of consumer goods to spend it on. (2:212)

Cubans are therefore divided; between generations, between the leadership and other levels of the government, between the

leadership and the increasingly discontented population. They are divided over the future of the revolution and Cuba's future in world affairs.

It also remains isolated, despite its diplomatic efforts to establish better relations with a number of Latin American countries. The number of flights landing at Havana's international airport for instance is less than one-twentieth the number landing in Puerto Rico. (2:213) It also remains isolated from the main currents affecting other Latin American countries--democracy, human rights, and economic development.

Lastly, Cuba has rejected the Soviets' sense of reform and self-examination. Fidel Castro wants no part of glasnost or perestroika. Cuba has shown no signs of opening up its system, even partially as have the Soviets, and has instead been critical of the Soviets for suggesting that Cuba do likewise. As a result, it is not hard to conclude that Cuba may produce even more friction between itself and the USSR, further removing Cuba from the main currents of world affairs. (2:213)

Today's slogans tend to dwell on the themes of austerity and voluntarism. The recurring words are deber and cumplir--duty and fulfillment. Then, there is the most well known of all Cuban slogans, "Towards Victory Always." However, for Cubans, what constitutes victory, and how long is always? (33:376)

Recognition and Diplomacy

In 1961 the United States hoped the Cuban revolution was a passing fancy and that a policy of containment and isolation would quickly bring the revolution's demise. Thirty years have passed and Fidel Castro and his regime are still in power.

For his part, Fidel Castro has reached out to establish diplomatic relations with governments he once vowed to overthrow. With the exception of El Salvador he is pursuing state-to-state relations and is not calling for outright subversive tactics. Also, most Latin American countries do not feel threatened by Castro and many have re-established normal diplomatic relations with Havana. Furthermore, Cuba has reached out to more than 100 other countries of the world, including US allies in NATO and Japan. The United States is the only major country that does not have normal relations with Cuba. (34:55-56)

Fidel Castro has noted, however, the "excellent" relations the United States has with China and the Soviet Union, and the different relationship the United States has with Cuba. He states with pride, "We are left with the honor of being one of the few adversaries of the United States." He continues, "Cuba would be a great adversary...a firm adversary...an adversary that does not give in...a very morally strong adversary." This should not be any surprise. For Fidel Castro, an adversarial relationship with the United States is the key to the political underpinnings and orientation of the Castro government. In order to justify the themes of his speeches and the maintenance of a nation in arms, Castro needs an outside threat. In the United States he finds his

permanent threat, the "Yankee menace." Castro has said on at least two occasions that Cuba could never relax its state of military preparedness even if the United States were to become a communist country. He fears the United States for its size and geographical proximity. But much more, Castro has maintained his adversarial relationship with the United States in order to place himself in a leadership role in international affairs. In his mind, this role would surely have escaped him if he had chosen the path to democracy in 1959. (19:73-74)

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The challenge for the United States and Cuba is to reexamine their foreign policies after Fidel Castro and to find ways of improving basic nation-to-nation relations. Castro has never been willing to compromise his policies on revolution to better Cuban relations with the United States. But, the fact remains that one day the United States and Cuba will eventually be drawn closer together because of geographic, economic and cultural realities.

In a post-Castro era, Cuban moderates might be convinced that it is time to discuss negotiations leading to diplomatic relations. Likewise, if those officials should come to power, the new Cuban government might be less "adventuresome" and neutral to the "threat from the North". (5:50)

But what might the Cuban agenda be in an era following Fidel Castro? Is the logic for negotiations and re-engagement after his demise sufficient enough to begin diplomatic relations? The trend in the last two years tends to point in the direction that negotiations might be more promising than ever before.

Some of the private discussions being held could continue on noncontroversial issues. Bilateral understandings could be improved to include discussions on reestablishing normal air service between the United States and Cuba, measures to avoid interference in one another's radio channels, and cooperation between the country's coast guards. With renewed US emphasis in the "drug war" centered on Latin America, the two governments could begin talks leading to agreements on interdicting narcotics traffic. If relations could be improved in an atmosphere of cooperation, an accord might even be reached on compensation for former US property owners and a timetable for lifting the US economic embargo against Cuba. As the negotiation process proceeded, confidence would be given a chance to grow. Public opinion could be influenced in a positive way that might lead to full diplomatic relations. In time, the United States and Cuba may find ways to discuss or influence Cuba's dependency on the Soviet Union, along with ways to permit Cuba to rejoin the trading nations of the West--economically, politically, and socially.

The situation ahead is a process which will require much time and honest dialogue. It is a process of incremental growth in diplomacy, over a long period of time. Following the Castro era, the United States should not demand that Cuba make sweeping political changes as a pre-condition for negotiations. The US approach should be supportive, not confrontational. Thus, it should encourage concessions on both sides in order to bring about better relations. Cooperation with the new Cuban government might

even help persuade the country to consider an alternative to the Soviets' influence over Cuba. (3:888)

As a result, the United States could obtain a higher level of accomplishment in two of its national security objectives cited at the beginning of this paper. It could help neutralize the Soviets' influence in the Western Hemisphere, permitting Cubans to pursue a more independent course. And secondly, through United States-Cuban cooperation the countries of the hemisphere could begin to address root causes of regional conflicts and the building of greater political stability.

The United States needs to come to terms with Cuba in a post-Castro era. What is not needed, however, is to continue to ignore Cuba or attempt to mold it into America's image. The United States should recognize the important differences which have historically divided the hemisphere's Latin American countries, especially Cuba. The people desire internal progress and development. They see solving the economic and social issues having precedence over political and institutional fundamentals. Cuban people already see this need. But, they can not currently freely express their desires, free from Castro's domination and the prerogatives of the Soviet Union. These peoples' dignity and autonomy of action are goals worthy of United States support.

The United States in a post-Castro era has an opportunity for constructive work with Cuba. But it must leave behind the arrogance of Wilsonianism which has led to imposing US ways on others. Additionally, the United States needs to look at the


world as more multipolar where diversity and legitimate aspirations exist. The United States needs to work with the Cuban people to permit them to rejoin the world community. In that way the United States will be able to protect its own security interests in a world in the future that is much different than it ever was in 1959. (35:31-32)

The difficult issues facing the United States today are international in scope. Regional conflicts can no longer be resolved in isolation, but rather require cooperative efforts by a host of nations. Cuba, should take part in those international efforts. Problems such as the protection of the environment, population movements and immigration, regional communications and transportation networks, methods for spreading technology and means for increasing food production, as well as ways to deal with regional conflicts, terrorism and narcotics trafficking all require answers and a commitment to their resolution. (36:25) Cuba needs to do its part especially in the latter three areas.

Additionally, the financial resources of the Inter-American Development Bank will be needed if a post-Castro Cuba is to reenter, legitimately, into world affairs. Its abilities to bring technical assistance and human resources is essential for Cubans in developing a framework to rebuild the disaster left behind by Fidel Castro.

Effecting such changes will be difficult. Fixing the problems of social dislocation, debt and trade, and interacting on conflict resolution will require a high level of dedication and

seriousness. Whether it will happen or not no one can tell. But for the United States, it clearly represents the best hopes for reestablishing more cooperative relations with the Cuban people--our neighbors just 90 miles off the Florida coast.


Cuba
Provincia boundary
National capital
Provincia capital
Railroad
Road
0 50 100 Kilometers
0 50 100 Miles
US
Key Largo
Key West
Nassau
New Providence
Eleuthera
Andros Island
Cat Island
San Salvador
THE BAHAMAS
Great Exuma
Long Island
Crooked Island
Acklins Island
Cay Sal Bank (THE BAHAMAS)
Archipiélago de Sabana Camaguey
Havana
Matanzas
Cárdenas
Corralillo
Isabela de Sagua
Cabañas
San Cristóbal
Artemisa
La Esperanza
PINAR DEL RIO
Pinar del Río
Los Arroyos
Guane
La Fe
Playa Rosario
Pedro Betancourt
Colón
VILLA CLARA
Caibarién
Santa Clara
MATANZAS
CIENFUEGOS
Cienfuegos
Playa Girón
Trinidad
Sancti Spíritus
SANCTI SPIRITUS
Tunas de Zaza
Jucaro
CIEGO DE AVILA
Ciego de Avila
Morón
Esmeralda
Florida
Nuevitas
Camaguey
CAMAGUEY
Marti
Las Tunas
LAS TUNAS
Gibara
Holguin
HOLGUIN
Antilla
Moa
Baracoa
Bayamo
Manzanillo
GRANMA
Niquero
GUANTANAMO
Guantánamo
Caimanera
US NAVAL BASE
Santiago de Cuba
SANTIAGO DE CUBA
Santa Cruz del Sur
ISLA DE LA JUVENTUD
Nueva Gerona
La Fe
Isla de la Juventud
Cayo Largo
Archipiélago de los Jardines de la Reina
Guanchos Cay (THE BAHAMAS)
Cayo Coco
Cay Lobos (THE BAHAMAS)
Cayo Romano
Cayo Guajaba
Cayo Sabinal
Jumentos Cays
Cape Verde (THE BAHAMAS)
Cay Santo Domingo (THE BAHAMAS)
Great Inagua
CAYMAN ISLANDS (UK)
George Town
HAITI
Montego Bay
Annotto Bay
Port Antonio
JAMAICA
Savanna la Mar
Kingston
Morant Bay
Navassa Island (US)
Les Cayes

POLITICAL CHRONOLOGY

1952: Fulgencio Batista seizes power through a military coup. Ends constitutional government in Cuba.

1953: Fidel Castro attacks the Moncada barracks in Santiago de Cuba. The attack fails and survivors are sentenced to 15 years imprisonment.

1955: Batista proclaims a general amnesty. Fidel Castro and others released. Castro departs for Mexico to organize armed resistance against the Batista government.

1956: Fidel Castro returns to Cuba. Establishes guerrilla operations in Cuba's Sierra Maestra mountains.

1957: Fidel Castro leads first successful guerrilla operation against the Rural Guard post at La Plata.

1958: Raul Castro establishes guerrilla operations on a second front in the Sierra Cristal mountains. The US imposes an arms embargo against the Batista government. The government's military operation against the guerrilla forces fail. A military coup in December ousts Batista.

1959: On January 8, Fidel Castro arrives in Havana. In February, he becomes Prime Minister. In May, the government enacts the agrarian reform bill.

1960: In May, Cuba and the Soviet Union re-establish diplomatic relations. In June, the Cuban government nationalizes US petroleum properties. In July, the US cuts the Cuban sugar quota. Between August and October, additional properties are seized. The US imposes a trade embargo on Cuba.

1961: In January, the US and Cuba sever diplomatic relations. In April, the Bay of Pigs invasion fails. Over 10 percent of Cuba's population leave the island. Fidel Castro announces that he is a Marxist-Leninist.

1962: October 22-28; the missile crisis. Soviet missiles are removed and the US agrees not to invade Cuba.

1964: Fidel Castro challenges the US and Soviet Union regarding Cuba's role in exporting revolution to the Third World.

1965: The PSP is reorganized as the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC).

1967: Ernesto Che Guevara is killed in Bolivia.

1968: Cuba reconciles differences with the Soviet Union. Cuba announces the "revolutionary offensive" leading to the nationalization of 5700 small businesses.

1970: The economy fails to meet the 10 million ton sugar crop objective. The economy falls into disarray.

1975: The Family Code is issued, establishing the laws regulating family, marriage and divorce. Cuba adopts its first Five Year Plan. Castro sends Cuban troops to Angola.

1976: The new socialist constitution is proclaimed. Cuba's administrative units are reorganized into 14 new provinces.

1977: The US and Cuba establish limited diplomatic relations by opening interests sections in Washington and Havana. Relations with US sour with the deployment of Cuban troops to Ethiopia.

1978: Cuban exiles are permitted to return to Cuba for brief family visits. Cuba backs revolutionary movements in Nicaragua and El Salvador.

1979: Fidel Castro is elected President at the 6th Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit in Havana. Cuban leadership of NAM is hurt by Cuban support for Soviet invasion of Afganistan.

1980: Mariel boatlift of 125,000 Cubans to the US.

1983: US invades Grenada, captures and arrests Cuban construction workers and troops.

1985: US begins broadcasts of Voice of America's Radio Marti into Cuba. Havana suspends permission for US family visits to Cuba.

1986: Limited travel to Cuba is re-established. Castro announces campaign for "rectification of errors".

1987: US and Cuba sign an agreement which returns 2000 "undesirables" to Cuba. The US agrees to accept 20,000 new Cuban immigrants annually.

1988: Cuba permits inspection visits by outside observers regarding human rights violations.

1989: In April, Cuba is visited by Soviet President Gorbachev. Castro again rejects use of Soviet-style perestroika for Cuba. Fidel Castro announces a temporary suspension of Cuban troop withdrawals from Angola, citing violations of the peace accords.

1990: In April, the United States broadcasts Television Marti into Cuba. Castro protests and cites this as a violation of Cuba's sovereignty.

1991: Agreement date for complete withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

(4:395-399 and 27:38-39)

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